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The European Union (EU) generalised system of preferences (GSP Scheme) grants
preferential treatment to 88 eligible countries. There are, however, concerns that the
restrictive features (such as rules of origin, low preference margin and low coverage)
of the existing scheme indicate gravitation towards commercial trade agenda to
which efficiency imperatives appear subordinated. Whether these concerns are gen-
uine is an empirical question whose answer largely determines whether, after Brexit,
the United Kingdom continues with the existing specifics of the EU scheme or
develops a more inclusive United Kingdom-specific GSP framework. This study quan-
titatively examines the efficiency of the EU GSP as it relates to United Kingdom ben-
eficiaries from 2014 to 2017. We draw on the descriptive efficiency estimation (the
utilisation rate, potential coverage rate and the utility rate) using import data across
88 beneficiary countries and agricultural products of the Harmonised System Code
Chapter 1 to 24. Asides the Rules of Origin that, generally, harm the uptake of GSP,
low preference margin is found to cause low utilisation rates in a non-linear manner.
Essentially, a more robust option (such that allows “global Cumulation” or broader
product coverage) could, substantially, lower the existing barriers to trade and
upsurge the efficiency of the GSP scheme.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Membership of the European Union (EU) Customs union allows the
United Kingdom to apply the EU tariff schedule to its imports
(Holmes, Rollo, Dawar, & Mathis, 2016). This includes the application
of preferential terms to exports of developing countries within the
special and differential treatment (SDT) framework (Mendez-Parra, te
Velde, & Kennan, 2016). Such “special and differential treatment,”
offered based on “non-reciprocity,” specifically models the assertion
that “treating unequals equally simply exacerbated inequalities”
(UNCTAD, 2015). This was not the intention of the Generalised Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP hereafter), which was an essential aspect of
the SDT framework, and designed to integrate developing countries
into the world trading system (Brenton, 2003). Brexit has meant that
the United Kingdom designed its GSP scheme and given the paucity
of time it is agreed that the existing EU GSP scheme will be rolled
over to ensure continuity in the trading arrangement with developing
and least developed countries.
There appears to be a consensus that unless GSP arrange-
ments are put in place, the trade regime of the EU will no longer
apply to imports into the United Kingdom immediately after Brexit
(Jones, 2016; Stevens & Kennan, 2016). The easiest way to over-
come the resultant market access challenge involves replicating
the EU's GSP scheme in the short term (Hoekman, Rollo, Wilkin-
son, & Winters, 2016; Jones, 2016; Marx, 2018; Molinuevo,
2017). Such a route would allow the United Kingdom to stabilise
its trade relationships with developing countries and situate effec-
tive transitional market access arrangements in the immediate
post-Brexit period (Herman, 2016; Mendez-Parra et al., 2016;
Ungphakorn, 2016).
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However, the 2014 EU's revision to the GSP scheme indicates an
inclination towards commercial intents to which efficiency impera-
tives appear subordinated (Siles-Brügge, 2014). The reform made all
high-income and upper-middle-income countries ineligible for GSP
treatment while also made it easier for a beneficiary's competitive
product sections to be graduated (De Ville and Orbie 2014; Siles-
Brügge, 2014). The basis for reducing GSP beneficiaries from 176 to
88 and for introducing the so-called “graduation” mechanism is to
keep with the EU's claim of being “the world's major development
actor”. Rather than representing a move towards improving the value
of trade preferences for the “economies most in need,” there are how-
ever reasons to argue that the revision theoretically provides the EU
with more leverage to pursue its commercial interests (Damro, 2015;
De Bièvre & Poletti, 2013; De Gucht & Barnier, 2012; De Ville, Orbie,
& Relations, 2014; Langan & Price, 2016; Larik, 2015). Whether these
concerns are genuine is an empirical question whose answer largely
determines whether, after Brexit, the United Kingdom continues with
the existing specifics of the EU scheme or develops a more inclusive
United Kingdom-specific GSP framework.
This article, therefore, evaluates the United Kingdom's trade
under the current EU GSP scheme to ascertain the utilisation of pref-
erences by beneficiary developing countries. Secondly, identifies the-
matic recommendations applicable to the United Kingdom GSP
stemming from the evaluation of the current system and relative effi-
ciency of the different regimes—GSP, GSP+ and Everything But Arms
(EBA). Broadly speaking, the recommendations are targeted at facili-
tating policy options towards designing a new United Kingdom GSP
regime that is better at supporting development than the status quo.
The efficiency evaluation of the existing GSP scheme is based on esti-
mations of the utilisation rates, utility rates and potential coverage.
The outlook of the efficiency indicators is matched to the four
core features of the existing GSP scheme—preference margins, rules
of origin, non-tariff barriers and product coverage. A dataset of
88 GSP beneficiary countries is used for the period 2014–2017 and
exporter-products estimation is carried out at 6-digit level across HS
Chapter 1 to 24.
The section that follows presents a review of the literature fea-
turing efficiency, utilisation of the GSP scheme, the rules of origin,
value of preference as well as preference utilisation. This is followed
by data and methods in Section 3, while Section 4 discusses the main
findings of the study. Section 5 makes valuable post-Brexit trade pol-
icy recommendations.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
The current study reviews past studies that assess the linkage between
existing EU GSP scheme and the strategies adopted by the United
Kingdom. This matters for the growth and strength of the economy,
alongside other studies that have either assessed macroeconomic pol-
icy, the role of energy in the growth-emissions nexus (Adedoyin,
Alola, & Bekun, 2020; Adedoyin & Zakari, 2020; Kirikkaleli, Adedoyin, &
Bekun, 2020) as well as the importance of trade and FDI in an
economy (Adedoyin, Bello, Isah, & Agabo, 2020; Udi, Adedoyin, &
Sarkodie, 2020; Udi, Bekun, & Adedoyin, 2020).
2.1 | The efficiency and the value of existing
EU GSP
Several studies highlight the development relevance of non-reciprocal
preferences for developing countries and express concerns about
preference erosion that could arise from the coexistence of “reciproc-
ity.” Theoretically, non-reciprocal trade preferences (such as the GSP
scheme) are a vital element of protection patterns across the globe
and play a crucial role in shaping trade opportunities for beneficiary
developing countries. This is particularly the case for the 88 beneficia-
ries of EU generalised system of preferences (GSP). It is not surprising
that the gravitation towards reciprocity raises concerns about the ero-
sion of preferences and betrayal of “trade-development” nexus of the
GSP scheme. Whether these concerns are genuine, and how they
might be addressed is largely dependent on the “interpretation of real-
ity” of these arrangements. Within this context, this study aims to
estimate how much the existing EU preferences are utilised by
exporters, how the utilisation rates diverge across eligible products
and countries and situating the resultant divergence within the exis-
ting features of the scheme.
So far, the majority of empirical studies have assessed the effi-
ciency of EU preferences based on the entire preferential regimes that
exporters are eligible for (DeMaria, Drogue, & Matthews, 2008; Keck
& Lendle, 2012; Wijayasiri, 2007). Keck and Lendle (2012) opine that
this is more realistic than estimating the efficiency of a specific regime
alone. However, this does not necessarily reflect the actual picture of
each regime especially with the likelihood of putting both reciprocal
and non-reciprocal arrangements in the same basket. This, indeed,
overstates the efficiency rates even in the face of eroded preference
margins or restrictive rules of origins (RoOs). The efficiency estimation
must, therefore, be adapted specifically to each regime, given that the
administrative requirements and the rules of origin vary from one
preference regime to the other.
This study follows Zhou and Cuyvers (2012) which specifically
examines the efficiency of the EU GSP scheme as it relates to ASEAN
beneficiary countries, for the period 1990–2007. However, the study
of Zhou and Cuyvers (2012) is dated especially that the 2011 Rules of
Origin revision and the 2014 GSP reform remain unaccounted for. By
adapting the efficiency estimation of United Kingdom GSP to this spe-
cific context and by covering all the beneficiary countries, this study
aims to derive more general conclusions about the efficiency esti-
mates and fill the gap in the literature.
2.2 | The utilisation of GSP scheme
A first approach to examining the economic value of a preferential
regime is to assess the degree of utilisation (Cirera, Foliano, &
Gasiorek, 2016). The GSP utilisation rate is the proportion of goods
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eligible for GSP treatment that use it. This is given as the ratio of
imports that enter via a preferential arrangement and the eligible
imports that could have benefitted from preferential treatment.
(Hakobyan, 2015) suggests that low utilisation rates are evidence that
trade preferences confer little or no economic value. It is posited by
some others that the utilisation rate may not give the best perspective
of the value of a preferential regime. According to Persson and
Wilhelmsson (2016), the utilisation rate may be informative in some
ways. For instance, low utilisation rates could reveal certain hidden
costs (related to rules of origin requirements, administrative cost and
other compliance costs) that come with requesting preferential treat-
ment. These unobserved trade costs constitute Non-Tariff Barriers
(NTBs) and unambiguously lowered export volumes while having
ambiguous effects on the value of trade preferences.
Differently, low utilisation rates could indicate an insufficient dif-
ference between the preferential tariff and non-preferential tariff
rates—preference margin (Nilsson, 2016) or it could indicate inade-
quate product coverage (Cirera & Cooke, 2015). On the basis thereof,
the vast majority of the assessment of ineffectiveness of preferential
arrangement emanates from the evidence of low utilisation rates.
Table A1 shows empirical studies on the utilisation of trade
preferences.
2.3 | Rules of origin
At a time when an increasing number of exporters are globalising
their parts procurement and production networks, it becomes impera-
tive to determine where goods originate (Donner Abreu, 2013). The
economic nationality of imported goods must be ascertained and
should be suitably linked to trade policy measures (Tsirekidze, 2017).
To achieve this, certain criteria such as rule of origin requirements are
applied. The rules of origin require that products are deemed to have
originated from a particular country if they are either wholly obtained
in that country or sufficiently worked or processed there
(Tsirekidze, 2017).
Products are “wholly” obtained in a particular beneficiary coun-
try if only the entire production is carried out in the same country
(Krishna, 2005). In such a case, the smallest addition or input from
any other country disqualifies such product from being “wholly
obtained.” This categorisation applies mainly to things that have nat-
ural occurrence and to products that are made entirely from them
(Bombarda & Gamberoni, 2013). Nevertheless, originating status can
still be obtained on the condition that the non-originating materials
used have gone through “sufficient working or processing”
(Tsirekidze, 2017).
2.4 | The value of preference margin
The most widely used measure of the value of trade preferences is
the Value of Preference Margin (VPM). In most cases, the preference
margin reflects a static welfare gain derived for using trade
preferences. Against this backdrop, the value of preference margin is
computed as the quantity exported multiply by the absolute differ-
ence between the “most favoured nation (MFN)” tariff and the prefer-
ential tariff given to preference beneficiaries.
One of the earliest evidence of the value of preference margin
was by Yamazaki (1996). Yamazaki evaluated the effect of the “Uru-
guay Round Agreement on Agriculture” on the value of preferences.
As a percentage of imports, the author reported 9% preferential
imports for the EU, 2% for Japan and 6% for the United States. The
aggregate value of preferences across the three donor countries
amounted to $1,853 million, in which the EU provided roughly 73%
with Japan and the United States providing 14% with each. In the
case of the EU, the benefits accrued to sugar was about 46%.
Recent studies have made a further attempt to measure the value
of EU preferences. For instance, Candau and Jean (2009) estimate the
value of preferences on aggregate trade for 2001. The authors esti-
mated preference margin as a percentage of dutiable exports into the
EU, thereby revealing the extent to which recipients' trade relations
with the EU depend on preferential market access. Assuming full
utilisation, the preferential access granted by the EU to African LDC
was worth Eur 182 million, to non-LDC in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eur
521 million, and about Eur 510 million worth granted to other LDCs.
The estimation in Candau and Jean (2009) covered all products
exported into the EU but not extended to those covered under pref-
erential tariff rate quotas (such as bananas, beef and sugar) which
accounted for a substantial share of rents.
2.5 | Preference utilisation and preference
margin nexus
The probability of preference usage is positively related to preference
margin (Keck & Lendle, 2012). There is an easy explanation to this;
given that certain costs, such as rules of origin requirement and
administrative costs, are linked to preference usage, trade preferences
may only be used when exports are enough to generate significant
duty savings. Using different methodologies, studies reveal that
utilisation rates adjust in response to preference margins and volume
of exports across different regimes (Alexandraki, 2004; Bureau,
Chakir, & Gallezot, 2007; Candau, Fontagne, & Jean, 2004; DeMaria
& Drogue, 2008; Inama, 2003; Manchin, 2006; Wijayasiri, 2007). A
number of these studies specifically relate to either the United States
or the EU market. For instance, Candau et al. (2004) evaluate the
utilisation of EU trade preferences for 2001. The study reveals gener-
ally high utilisation rates averaging 82% and more for products with
high preference margins. For 2002 agricultural imports in the United
States and EU, Bureau et al (2007) adopt a probit model using highly
disaggregated data at the exporter-product level. Their analysis
reflects a direct linkage between the probability of preference usage
and both preference margins and volume of exports, with aggregate
utilisation rates above 80%. Hakobyan (2011) finds a positive impact
of preference margins and export volumes on the United States GSP
utilisation rates by using panel data.
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A similar study by Candau and Jean (2009) reports a preference
utilisation rate well over 82% for 2001 product exports into the EU
and higher for products with sufficient preferential margins. However,
Hakobyan (2011) indirectly recognises the significance of fixed costs
by illustrating a possible non-linear linkage between the preference
margin and the utilisation rate. Specifically, Hakobyan examined a ceil-
ing beyond which the positive linkage fades out. This finding is
insightful and particularly corroborate Manchin (2006) which estab-
lishes that preference margin has a little or no effect on the size of
preferential trade following the decision to request preferential
treatments.
3 | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Data description
A renewed GSP regulation applied from 1 January 2014 following
changes agreed in October 2012. This new GSP regulated the prefer-
ential treatment granted to developing countries over 10 years. The
new regulation simplified the previous scheme such that beneficiaries'
list was reviewed from 176 to 88 and competitive sectors excluded. It
is worthwhile to mention that most existing studies have not taken
the most recent changes into account. As such this article covers the
period after the new regulation (from 2014 to 2017). This article
adopted three different complementary approaches to assess the effi-
ciency of the United Kingdom GSP, namely (a) quantitative analysis of
the efficiency indicators—utilisation rate, coverage rate and the utility
rate; (b) country and product case studies: (c) Frequency distribution
analysis of preference margins and the origin rules.
The analysis of the scheme is carried out using the most current
and detailed trade and tariff data obtained from Eurostat of the
European Commission. Tabulation is used in presenting the extent to
which eligible countries and products have utilised the United King-
dom GSP at the post-reform period. Throughout this analysis, it is
acknowledged that the extent to which GSP preferences could be
offered to developing countries is primarily dependent on the
utilisation level. Additionally, it is identified that GSP utilisation level
depends on other factors like preference margin, product coverage,
rules of origin requirements and non-tariff barriers.
An in-depth estimation of the GSP efficiency is conducted,
bearing in mind the aforementioned factors which could hinder
effective utilisation. Trade data by country and by products were
matched with tariff data at 6-digit level. Precisely, the analysis is
based on export flows towards the United Kingdom market of
roughly 472 agricultural products of HS Chapter 1–24. The ratio-
nale for focusing on agricultural products is that substantial trade
preferences are granted to developing countries for agricultural
exports, while the EU applies a modest trade restriction to its non-
agricultural imports. The trade data of the 88 beneficiaries are seg-
mented into three in line with the variants of GSP scheme:
27 countries benefiting from the basic GSP, 13 countries for GSP+
and 48 beneficiaries of the EBA program.
To allow for simplicity in presentation, some of the results are
aggregated across products and countries at the 2-digit level. The
analysis used trade data for the 4 years after the scheme's reform.
Any analysis extended beyond this period could result in a significant
data distortion because of changes in policy over the years. Hence,
this article allows for an accurate evaluation of the influence of the
modified regulation.
To achieve a good level of data consistency, the United Kingdom
import data was used against the beneficiaries' export data. This is
because the reliability and accessibility of the United Kingdom import
data are far better than that of all the beneficiary countries under
investigation. The overall consistency of the findings in this article is
thus enhanced.
Import data for the United Kingdom is taken from Eurostat which
allows downloading data by preference eligibility and by import
regime. There is no such information as to whether product imports
entered via a preferential quota regime. It must be noted that
exporting countries are faced with different preferential regimes (such
as EPA, SADC, PAC and ESA) and offered by the United Kingdom, and
as such preference regimes are found to overlap for many products.
The EU data only shows regimes for MFN = 0, MFN > 0, GSP = 0,
GSP > 0, Preference = 0, Preference > 0 and Unknown. It then
becomes difficult to identify how many preferential arrangements fall
under the “Preference” category. Taking all preference regimes
together could give the wrong impression that overall preference
utilisation is high. As the focus of this article is on GSP scheme and its
variants, this article used data that applies to only MFN = 0, MFN > 0,
GSP = 0 and GSP > 0 by import regime and data for “only MFN” and
“only GSP” by preference eligibility. Imports for which the regime
used is “unknown” are disregarded.
3.2 | Estimation technique
This article provides tables in which the efficiency indicators are
summarised, hence ignoring all imports that enter via non-dutiable
MFN rate (MFN = 0) or imports that are not eligible for GSP pref-
erence. The presented tables show a summary of the obtained
data based on the estimation of the utilisation rate, coverage rate
and the utility rate for different subsets of the data. Table 1 shows
utilisation rates for different agricultural products at the 2-digit
level. As expected, we find that the utilisation rate increases with
the coverage rate for most of the products. For some other prod-
ucts, utilisation rates remain high even for coverage rates below
average. While the latter indicates the existence of huge potentials
for coverage expansion, one cannot possibly observe any clear
“threshold” beyond which additional coverage either stagnates or
diminishes the utilisation rate.
We also aggregated import flows by HS section. Table 2 shows
utilisation rates for each section. A noticeable pattern in all countries
is that utilisation rates are high across agricultural products of
section 4 (Prepared Foodstuffs, Beverages, etc.—HS Chapter 16–24).
However, one may expect that the utilisation rate is relatively lower
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for cocoa and cocoa preparations (HS Chapter 18) despite that it falls
in the section 4 category. Partly, this is because the MFN tariffs on
cocoa beans (raw or roasted) are currently set at 0% which reflects a
low level of competition at the primary production stage. Also, devel-
oping countries which are moving up to the next stage of the
production process (cocoa preparations) are faced with tariff escala-
tion and restrictive rules of origin.
Table 3 shows utilisation rates, coverage rates and utility rates for
the largest exporters into the United Kingdom (by imports value),
while Table 4 aggregates at an exporter-products level across all GSP
TABLE 1 The efficiency indicators for United Kingdom's import at 2-digit product level
HS
chapters Product groups
Total
imports (£)
Utilisation
rate (%)
Potential coverage
rate (%)
Utility
rate (%)
1 Live animals 509,833 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 Meat and edible meat offal 5,407,807 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs 373,728,718 86.39 99.37 85.85
4 Dairy and dairy products 2,696,245 100.00 23.69 23.69
5 Products of animal origin 2,346,769 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 Live trees and other plants 18,429,217 99.32 96.26 95.61
7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 87,389,298 97.10 55.39 53.78
8 Fresh apples, pears and other fresh fruits 291,872,808 97.21 15.40 14.97
9 Coffee, tea and spices 405,312,019 85.54 14.31 12.24
10 Grains 237,694,589 99.46 4.93 4.90
11 Products of malt; starches 11,477,059 97.90 41.83 40.95
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; medicinal plants;
straw and fodder
31,119,059 82.79 3.85 3.18
13 Lac; gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts 22,993,210 47.54 0.22 0.10
14 Vegetable plaiting materials 5,541,985 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils 73,288,927 96.27 37.94 36.53
16 Prepared meat, fish, crustaceans, molluscs or other
aquatic invertebrates
189,670,635 98.55 98.49 97.06
17 Sugars and sugar confectionary 28,566,939 97.47 28.33 27.61
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations 4,706,464 79.33 93.31 74.03
19 Prepared cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastry cooks'
products
15,348,898 97.34 97.06 94.63
20 Seed fruits products (in seed equivalent) 55,894,127 95.43 78.20 74.63
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 45,886,224 92.80 97.53 90.51
23 Residues/waste from food industries; prepared animal
fodder
101,465,529 93.17 8.40 7.83
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 13,133,164 99.36 79.61 79.10
Abbreviation: HS, harmonised system. Source: Author's calculation based on Eurostat data.
TABLE 2 The efficiency indicators for United Kingdom's import by HS section-wise, 2017
Section
MFN + GSP
total imports
Total dutiable
imports
MFN dutiable
imports
Imports covered by
GSP scheme
Imports
via GSP
Potential
coverage
Utilisation
rate
Utility
rate
2 (£) 3 (£) 4 (£) 5 (£) 6 (£) 5/2 (%) 6/5 (%)
6/2
(%)
Section 1 384,646,966 254,189,215 12,330,384 372,022,427 321,478,991 95.72 86.41 83.58
Section 2 916,720,288 148,980,249 78,923,402 186,868,755 175,307,231 20.38 93.81 19.12
Section 3 73,178,424 59,061,579 45,396,648 27,809,024 26,772,242 38.00 96.27 36.58
Section 4 469,296,707 240,095,337 13,605,202 340,583,680 330,180,888 72.57 96.95 70.36
Total 1,843,842,385 702,326,380 150,255,636 927,283,886 853,739,352 50.29 92.07 46.30
Abbreviations: GSP, generalised system of preferences; HS, harmonised system; MFN, most favoured nation. Source: Author's calculation based on
Eurostat data.
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regimes. This is an aggregation across both country and product
groups. For the estimation in Table 3, it is assumed that each country
gets only one of the GSP variants. For instance, the utilisation rate of
EBA is based on the aggregation of all eligible exports into the United
Kingdom for which EBA is the only regime, even if some exports may
enter the United Kingdom under the basic GSP or GSP+. This way,
the problem of overlapping regimes is avoided.
Table 5 is a frequency distribution table constructed based on the
number of occurrences of 340 agricultural imports for each rule of ori-
gin classification and across four ranges of utilisation rate. In a nut-
shell, it involves building on simple combinatorics and the assumption
that each product import is likely to occur under any of the four origin
rules. Having estimated the total number of occurrences for each rule,
we created four ranges of utilisation rate and then matched product
observations to each of the ranges.
3.3 | Estimating GSP efficiency via descriptive
efficiency indicators
A primary approach to estimating the effectiveness of the GSP is to
assess the extent of utilisation. Until preferences are utilised, it is difficult
to specify the definite value derived by beneficiaries. Largely, the empiri-
cal literature has employed descriptive indicators like the utilisation rate
(UR), potential coverage rate (PCR) and the utility rate (UyR).
3.3.1 | Preference utilisation rate
Preference utilisation rate indicates the usage level of the existing
preferential Scheme. A preference regime offers a lower tariff rate,
relative to the MFN rate, to a beneficiary country for a specific prod-
uct. This could be granted within a reciprocal arrangement (such as
the Economic Partnership Agreements—EPAs) or a non-reciprocal pref-
erential scheme (such as the GSP scheme). Imports are described as
dutiable (MFN 6¼ 0) if they originate from a non-preference-receiving
country. In some instances, dutiable imports could come from a
preference-receiving country especially if certain products are not eli-
gible for preferential treatment. As a rule, preferential regimes have
exclusion lists and as such, do not accommodate all products from a
preference-receiving country in all cases. A few times, the MFN rates
for certain products are non-dutiable (MFN = 0) even in a no-prefer-
ence situation. Because of this, this study classifies importer-exporter-
product level import flows into four categories as shown in Figure 1.
The utilisation rate of the GSP regime μGSP is given as “the ratio
of imports that enter via the GSP regime and the imports eligible for
GSP treatments.” Simply put,
μGSP =D×
1
C +D
ð1Þ
Import flows A and B are disregarded, as they are not within the
“covered by GSP scheme” classification. Essentially, imports are
described as eligible for GSP treatment if products from a beneficiary
country are covered by the GSP scheme based on the tariff schedule.
In effect, MFN tariff TMFNz 6¼ 0. It, therefore, follows those products
with MFN tariff TMFNz = zero are ignored. In most cases, preferential
tariff T*xyz is mostly non-dutiable (T*xyz = 0) and if dutiable often takes
a lower value than the MFN tariff TMFNz (that is TMFNz > T*xyz). In such
a case, the exporting country derives a welfare gain from a preferen-
tial arrangement because of the positive difference between TMFNz
and T*xyz (known as Preference Margin).
Based on the foregoing, Equation (1) is modified as:
μGSP z,xð Þ=
MGSP z,xð Þ
EGSP z,xð Þ
ð2Þ
where,
MGSP(z,x) indicates imports that enter via the GSP regime.
ЕGSP(z, x) represents total imports eligible for GSP treatments.
Equation (2) above defines preference utilisation for product z from
exporting country x. The value of μGSP (z, x) for an individual transaction
is either 0 or 1. However, since data at the exporter-product level is an
aggregation of various transactions, then μGSP (z, x) takes a value
between 0 and 1. To present a descriptive analysis, this study aggregates
data at the importer-product level across import regime, GSP eligibility,
HS chapters and exporters. Keck and Lendle (2012) state three ways in
which data aggregation can be carried out; a simple average approach, a
trade-weighted average approach and a duty-weighted average
approach. While the three stated measure of preference utilisation gives
TABLE 4 United Kingdom's imports and GSP efficiency indicators from all effective beneficiaries
Year
MFN + GSP
total imports
Total dutiable
imports
MFN dutiable
imports
Imports covered
by GSP scheme
Imports
via GSP
Potential
coverage
Utilisation
rate
Utility
rate
1 2 (£) 3 (£) 4 (£) 5 (£) 6 (£) 5/4 (%) 6/5 (%)
6/3
(%)
2014 59,717,734,331 26,662,249,453 23,595,214,537 9,771,191,228 8,430,261,234 41.41 86.28 31.62
2015 60,297,926,525 27,937,944,857 25,374,130,871 9,214,043,698 7,980,369,811 36.31 86.61 28.56
2016 62,047,202,866 29,225,686,477 26,531,192,265 9,823,217,571 8,374,989,777 37.03 85.26 28.66
2017 70,309,550,481 32,284,981,572 29,411,164,026 10,921,763,073 9,336,541,843 37.13 85.49 28.92
Total 252,372,414,203 116,110,862,359 104,911,701,700 39,730,215,571 34,122,162,665 37.87 85.88 29.39
Abbreviations: GSP, generalised system of preferences; MFN, most favoured nation. Source: Author's calculations based on Eurostat data.
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the same result for transaction-level data, there is a noticeable variation
in the results for aggregated data. Nonetheless, the most suitable mea-
sure of preference utilisation for aggregated data (country group or
product group) is the trade-weighted approach (Keck & Lendle, 2012).
The simple average approach shows a downswing biasedness as a result
of modest usage of preferences in several small transactions. Similarly,
certain product imports do not attract duties especially if the preferential
regime is used and this tends to understate preference utilisation rate in
the case of duty-weighted average approach. In this light, this study esti-
mates product-exporter GSP utilisation using the Trade-weighted Aver-
age approach.
3.3.2 | Utilisation rate by trade-weighted average
This is given as the ratio of total preferential imports (in import value
term) and the total preference eligible imports. By aggregating across
the exporter-product level x and z, utilisation rate by trade-weighted
average (URTWA) is illustrated thus;
μTradeWeighted,zx =
P
z z
*
P
xx
*MGSP z,xð Þ
P
z z
*
P
xx
*EGSP z,xð Þ
ð3Þ
Equation (3) above represents the aggregated utilisation rate at
the exporter-product level. The utilisation rate of GSP based on Equa-
tion (3) illustrates the share of eligible imports used by beneficiaries.
In a strict sense, this may be too restrictive, given that it reflects only
actual exports. A wider approach takes account of product exports of
GSP beneficiaries that are not covered or that are excluded by the
scheme (often referred to as potential coverage). A higher percentage
of such estimate indicates how completely generalised the GSP
scheme appears for products.
3.3.3 | Potential coverage rate
The potential coverage rate is the ratio of imports eligible for GSP treat-
ment and the total dutiable imports. At the individual transaction level,
the potential coverage rate is calculated based on the following formula:
PCRGSP =
EGSP z,xð Þ
MDUTY z,xð Þ
ð4Þ
where,
ЕGSP(z, x) represents GSP eligible imports.
MDUTY(z,x) is the dutiable imports.
By aggregating across the exporter-product level x and z, Equa-
tion (4) becomes:
PCRGSP =
P
z z
*
P
xx
*EGSP z,xð Þ
P
z z
*
P
xx
*MDUTY z,xð Þ
ð5Þ
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3.3.4 | Utility rate
The utility rate offers and indicates how much of imports pay prefer-
ential rates compared to MFN rates. This is the ratio of imports
receiving preferential treatment and total dutiable imports. At the
product level, the Utility Rate is estimated using the formula below:
UyRGSP =
MGSP z,xð Þ
MDUTY z,xð Þ
ð6Þ
where,
MGSP(z, x) represents imports via the GSP scheme.
MDUTY(z,x) is the dutiable imports.
When Equation (6) is aggregated at the exporter-product level, it
becomes:
UyRGSP =
P
z z
*
P
xx
*MGSP z,xð Þ
P
z z
*
P
xx
*MDUTY z,xð Þ
ð7Þ
4 | RESULTS, DISCUSSION AND
IMPLICATIONS OF MAIN FINDINGS
The analysis in this article is limited to only agricultural products
because most developing countries rely on the creation of substantial
agricultural exports without having to face tariff escalation. The ques-
tion as to whether such exports have expedited development is
beyond the scope of this study and not considered. We also limit our
analysis to 2014–2017, a period in which the effects of 2014 GSP
revision can be captured. Since this article aims not to compare the
pre-reform and post-reform GSP efficiency, a period before the 2014
reform is not covered.
Table 1 shows the efficiency indicators for agricultural products
(HS Chapter 1–24) imported into the United Kingdom in 2017 from
88 developing countries. The analysis of the United Kingdom GSP
shows that the utilisation rate exceeds 90% in certain products but as
low as 47% in others across HS Chapter 1–24 products. This averaged
92.07% across products and exporters, exceeding the 2010 EU aver-
age of 85.0and 41.5% United States average based on the analysis in
Davies and Nilsson (2013).
The 2-digit level analysis revealed products of HS 9 as the most
imported in terms of value. Nevertheless, the utilisation rate is
highest for “Dairy and Dairy Products” (HS4). There are various rea-
sons for the variation in GSP utilisation rate, but most studies
recognised the substantial effect of rules of origin criteria. Asides
the RoOs that could create a non-tariff barrier to preferential mar-
ket access, this article finds a noticeable effect of preference margin
on the United Kingdom GSP utilisation. For instance, in 2017, the
preference margins for products of HS1, HS2, HS13 and HS14 are
low as illustrated in Figure 2, and this provides a basis for low
utilisation rates.
F IGURE 1 Types of import flows.
Source: Adapted from Keck and
Lendle (2012)
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The absolute difference between the MFN rates and the GSP rates
is termed “GSP Margins.” In most cases, MFN tariffs are higher than the
GSP tariffs, making the two graphs to deviate and reflect a gap. In the
graphical analysis above, the two graphs are found to overlap each
other across most of the imported HS1 and HS2 products (at 6-digit
level). This status of no gap between the MFN tariff graph and the GSP
tariff graph indicates a condition of insufficient GSP margins and
explains the rationale behind low GSP utilisation rate. This finding is
consistent with Keck and Lendle (2012) in the case of Canada (where
the utilisation rate is only 17% for preference margins below 1 and 75%
for margins above 1%). Although, the authors reported high utilisation
rates for the United States and EU even with low preference margins.
Given that the MFN rates for products of HS1, HS2 and HS5 are
set at zero (non-dutiable) in 2017, exporters are more inclined to
export under MFN conditions without having to comply with rules of
origin requirements and utilisation rate would naturally tend towards
zero (as in Nilsson & Dotter, 2011).
Figure 3 ranks the United Kingdom's imports across HS chapter
1–24 based on top 10 products with highest utilisation rate. Similar to
Dean and Wainio (2006), the 100% utilisation rate of HS 4 product goes
with an exceptionally low potential coverage rate of 23.69%. This is
informative and suggests that the efficiency of the GSP scheme should
not be assessed by estimating only the utilisation rate in isolation of the
coverage rate and the utility rate. Otherwise, certain products, for which
there exist potentials to expand products coverage, would be ignored.
For instance, even with the utilisation rates above 97% for products of
HS4, HS8, HS10, HS11 and HS17, the coverage rates are still below
average. What could be responsible for these significant coverage gaps?
F IGURE 2 Preference
margins based on MFN rates and
GSP rates, by product. GSP,
generalised system of
preferences; MFN, most favoured
nation. Source: Author's creation
based on Eurostat data
F IGURE 3 The United
Kingdom's top 10 agricultural
import with highest utilisation
rate. Source: Author's creation
based on Eurostat data
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In recent time, some EU GSP beneficiaries have been faced with
a tariff increase in higher-value products as a consequence of their
decision to increase processing capacity. As revealed by the 6-digit
level analysis of HS 9 products (coffee, tea and spices) where
unroasted green coffee beans attract no tariff under the United King-
dom GSP. However, roasted coffee beans attract a 2.6% ad valorem
tariff and unroasted decaffeinated coffee attracts a tariff of 4.8%.
Even in the face of increased tariff for higher-value products, GSP tar-
iff for same products remains below the MFN duties, but such tariff
increase places a huge restriction on product coverage.
Table 2 presents a section-wise analysis of the GSP efficiency
indicators for HS Chapter 1–24 products imported into the United
Kingdom in 2017.
Section 1: Live Animals and Products (HS Chapters 01–05),
Section 2: Vegetable Products (HS Chapters 06–14),
Section 3: Fats and Oils (HS Chapter 15),
Section 4: Prepared Foodstuffs, Beverages, etc. (HS Chapter 16–24).
The coverage offered under the United Kingdom GSP is quite
extensive for Section 1: Live Animals and Products (HS Chapters
01–05)—roughly 96.72% of imports are eligible for GSP preferences
despite having a much lower utilisation rate (86.41%) than the other
sections. The utility rate of section 1 at 83.58% shows that a large
percentage of the imports received preferential treatment and as a
result did not pay the MFN rate. Asides, products of section 4
(Prepared Foodstuffs, Beverages, etc.—HS Chapter 16–24) that
exhibited similar behaviour (utilisation rate at 96.95%, coverage rate
at 72.57% and utility rate at 70.36%), both sections 2 and 3 show sig-
nificantly low utility rate and potential coverage. it means that a large
part of the imports for sections 2 and 3 paid the MFN rate and cover-
age of these products is quite low under the United Kingdom GSP.
The low utility rates of section 2 and 3 confirm the stringency of non-
tariff barriers discussed in Siles-Brügge (2014).
Table 3 gives a breakdown of preferential imports as well as the
utilisation rate of the major GSP trading partners (identified in terms
of total imports via the GSP scheme).
During 2014–2017, the average GSP utilisation rate by major
trading partners was 88.83% and this figure exceeds the 85.88% aver-
age utilisation rate by all the beneficiaries. In other words, the major
trading partners utilised the scheme by an additional 2.95% relative to
the other beneficiaries. Based on the estimation of imports via GSP
and how it relates to the imports covered by the GSP scheme,
Bangladesh (EBA) shows an average utilisation rate of 99.02%. Other
countries with significant GSP utilisation rates are India (GSP) 89.97%,
and Pakistan (GSP+) 97.91%.
The utility rate by the major beneficiaries is 12.31% against the
average of 29.39% for all beneficiaries during 2014–2017. A lower
utility rate is an indication that the majority of imports into the United
Kingdom come under the MFN tariffs. This is particularly insightful
and corroborates the finding in Mohan, Khorana, and Choudhury
(2012) that factors other tariffs (coverage, RoOs, compliance costs,
administrative costs) significantly determine GSP utilisation.
The degree of utilisation also responded to the introduced new-
10-year cycle in 2014 in which the previous scheme was largely modi-
fied. As expressed in Ahmed (2014), exporters in beneficiary countries
required some time to adjust to the renewed GSP scheme and the
degree of utilisation reacted accordingly. Between 2014 and 2017,
the average utilisation rate by all beneficiaries was 85.88%. The analy-
sis in Table 3 reveals the average utilisation rates were higher at
86.28 and 86.61% in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Conversely, the
average utilisation rates were lower at 85.26 and 85.49% in 2016 and
2017, respectively. Following the 2014 revision to the GSP scheme,
the exclusion of too many sensitive products lowered the participa-
tion of major trading partners in the United Kingdom GSP. For
instance, between 2014 and 2017, the utilisation rate for China
declined from 76.86 to 0%, India from 91.12 to 88.70%, Vietnam from
61.79 to 60.37%, Thailand from 78.81 to 0% and Nigeria from 88.51
to 58.47%. The exclusion of several “sensitive” products, as noted in
Siles-Brügge (2014), further undermined preferential treatment and
resulted in lower product coverage.
It is worth noting that, other factors, such as preference margin,
rules of origin requirements, administrative costs (non-tariff measures)
also influence the utilisation of preferences. Many of these are related
to the existing conditions and the operational structure of the GSP
scheme. So, even in the face of extensive product coverage, benefi-
ciary countries may still not utilise the GSP scheme adequately
(Gasiorek et al., 2010). This is reflected in the case of Vietnam whose
GSP covered imports (£4,883,500,180) far exceeded that of Pakistan
(£3,659,508,794). Yet, Pakistan recorded a greater value of “imports
via GSP” (Vietnam—£ 2,934,445,526, Pakistan—£3,583,056,027). This
is not to undermine the ability of products coverage extension in driv-
ing GSP utilisation but a direct call to suggest a policy mix around
product coverage, eligibility criteria, rules of origin and supply-side ini-
tiative. Table 4 contains aggregate imports data for the United King-
dom from 88 beneficiary developing countries.
During the period 2014–2017, aggregate imports from 88 benefi-
ciary countries were £252.37 billion. Of this figure, only £39.73 billion
were eligible for GSP preferences. This suggests that only 6.35% of
the total imports from developing countries were covered under the
GSP scheme. By implication, the remaining 93.65% of the total prod-
ucts was imported under the MFN tariffs. The paltry 6.35% of the
imports covered between 2014 and 2017, maybe traceable to several
factors but largely to the revision of the scheme that became effective
in 2014. As pointed out earlier in this article, such revision resulted in
a downward review of GSP beneficiary list from 176 to 88 and gradu-
ation of certain sectors. As a result, the scope for preferential imports
considerably reduced.
It may be insufficient to assess the effectiveness of the GSP
scheme by merely looking at the share of total imports (MFN + GSP)
covered by the scheme (Zhou & Cuyvers, 2012). While it seems logical
to assume a direct relationship between product coverage and prefer-
ence utilisation, it is much more important to assess the success of a
preferential scheme by looking at how much available preferences are
utilised. The utilisation rate indicates how well the inherent benefits
of the GSP scheme are tapped by beneficiaries. It follows that more
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attention should be paid to actual imports via the GSP scheme. A look
at Table 4 shows that a total £34.12 billion benefitted from the
scheme out of the £39.73 billion imports covered. This figure repre-
sents a significant 85.88% utilisation rate of the United Kingdom GSP.
However, with 6.35% of imports covered by the GSP scheme of the
total imports (MFN + GSP), there exists a tremendous potential to
improve products coverage. Especially, considering that the potential
coverage ratios across all beneficiaries show a disappointingly low
average of 37.87% from 2014 to 2017. As noted earlier in this article,
such a low average of 37.87% indicates an insufficient coverage of
products under the United Kingdom GSP.
The analysis of GSP utilisation reveals that imports via GSP
scheme stagnated between 2014 and 2016, although with a slight
11.5% improvement in 2017. Despite this, both the aggregate duti-
able imports and the total MFN dutiable imports consistently
increased year on year. What factors could be responsible for this?
Recently, tariff liberalisation has been witnessed at all levels: mul-
tilaterally, regionally, bilaterally and unilaterally. This liberalisation pro-
cess propelled reduction in MFN tariffs. Expectedly, a continuous
reduction of MFN rate eroded preferential margins and impair the
utilisation of GSP. It is, therefore, logical to attribute the behaviour of
utilisation rate between 2014 and 2016 to the reduction of MFN tar-
iff during the same period. This finding is theory consistent, as noted
in Persson (2015) and evidenced the direct relationship between pref-
erence margins and preference utilisation. As a result, fewer beneficia-
ries utilised the United Kingdom GSP, during the period of low
preference margins.
The relationship between preference margins and the United
Kingdom GSP utilisation is further illustrated using a frequency distri-
bution table as shown in Table 5.
The analysis in Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of
340 agricultural products eligible under each variant of the United
Kingdom GSP. Of the 340 products analysed under the basic GSP,
about 304 products come under preference margin of less than 5%
(PM < 5%), 26 products under preference margin 5–10% (5% < PM
≤10%) and 10 products under preference margin 10–20% (10% < PM
≤20%). Out of the 304 products of “PM < 5%” category, about
138 (45.39%) products recorded zero rates of GSP utilisation, 92 prod-
ucts (30.26%) with a utilisation rate of less than 100% but greater
than 0% and 74 products (24.34%) with 100% utilisation rate. This
suggests that GSP beneficiaries took less advantage of the United
Kingdom GSP scheme when preference margin was low (PM < 5%) by
not using preferences at all for roughly 45.39% and utilising only
24.34% of the 304 products eligible under the scheme.
On the flip side, in the scenario of a relatively higher preference
margin (10% < PM ≤20%), about 50% of the eligible products
recorded 100% utilisation. This is higher than the 24.34% obtained in
a low preference margin scenario. And directly refute the generalisa-
tion of Manchin (2006) that preferential margin does not affect the
amount of preferential trade, once the decision to use a preferential
arrangement has been made.
However, the analysis of preference margin—GSP utilisation rela-
tionship for EBA and GSP+ shows a widely divergent route. For
instance, despite 10% < PM ≤20%, higher percentages (69.1%—EBA
and 58.77%—GSP+) of the eligible products (178 products—EBA and
114—GSP+) recorded GSP utilisation rate of 0%. This finding once
again emphasises the “economic puzzle” (as discussed earlier in this
article) regarding the linkage between preference margin and prefer-
ence utilisation. Essentially, we are inclined to agree to the conclusion
of Hakobyan (2011) about the existence of a non-linear relationship
between preference margin and utilisation rate. Hakobyan estimated
a cut-off point outside which the positive relationship between the
two variables vanishes. This finding is insightful and particularly points
out that low preference margin is not an overriding cause of low
utilisation in all cases. There is, therefore, a scope to further investi-
gate the specific beneficiaries' country-product features of the United
Kingdom GSP relating to local content of the product (rules of origin)
and/or the bureaucratic requirements of claiming GSP preference.
Table 6 shows the frequency distribution for rules of origin classifica-
tion and how it relates to the utilisation rate.
The frequency distribution table above shows the frequency of
occurrence for the four “rules of origin” classifications, along with four
ranges of the United Kingdom's GSP utilisation rate. The analysis illus-
trates the utilisation rates of 340 agricultural products based on RoOs
classification. About 175 products come under the “Wholly” rule and
this represents 51.47% of the total products analysed. It is not surpris-
ing that such percentage of agricultural products was imported under
the “wholly” rule as this categorisation applies mainly to things that
have natural occurrence and to products that are made entirely from
them. We also find that roughly 109 (62.28%) of the total “wholly”
imports showed significant utilisation rates of between 76 and 100%.
Understandably, the figures are less in the other categories. For
instance, fewer products were imported under the “Specific” rule
(115), “Any Heading” rule (41) and “% Value” (9). However, the
TABLE 6 Frequency distribution
table illustrating RoOs—GSP utilisation
relationship
Utilisation rate (%) % values Any heading Specific rule Wholly
0–25 5 16 25 54
26–50 0 1 2 6
51–75 2 1 4 6
76–100 2 23 84 109
Total 9 41 115 175
Abbreviations: GSP, generalised system of preferences; RoOs, rules of origins. Source: Author's computation
based on Eurostat data.
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“Specific” criterion recorded a higher percentage (73.04%), of the total
“specific rule” imports, having utilisation rates of between 76 and
100%. This simply suggests that despite agricultural products having
natural occurrence which adequately qualifies them as “wholly
obtained.” Developing countries are still attempting to increase their
processing capacity and have become enthusiastic in processing agri-
cultural products beyond their natural form before exporting. Quite
frankly, the United Kingdom's GSP rules of origin make some provi-
sions for higher-value products, but developing countries are required
to satisfy the “sufficient working or processing” before originating can
be obtained.
Essentially, RoOs could act as a “push factor” for developing
countries to consider further processing of agricultural products both
for local consumption and for exports, having obtained originating sta-
tus via “sufficient working or processing” (Hoekman et al., 2016).
Meanwhile, stringent RoOs depress higher-value agricultural exports
and subsequent utilisation. This finding specifically points out to one
issue identified in Khanal (2011) that RoOs discourage the utilisation
of GSP preferences. This article, therefore, presents an entirely differ-
ent lens through which RoOs could be seen as posing a challenge to
GSP utilisation.
5 | POST-BREXIT PROSPECTS AND
CONCLUSION
The existing GSP arrangements have the potential to benefit prefer-
ence recipients through diverse channels – Export growth, Preference
margin, cumulation rules (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008;
Melitz, 2003; Panagariya, 2002). The potential benefits, however, are
dependent on certain features of the existing scheme; First, RoO is
found to impact on product exports of developing countries by increas-
ing the cost of using the scheme (Bombarda & Gamberoni, 2013;
Georges, 2010; Grinols & Silva, 2008; Jakob & Fiebiger, 2003). Second,
the magnitude of product coverage in the beneficiary countries incen-
tivizes preference utilisation especially for products that are classified
as country's main exports (Candau & Jean, 2004; Chaplin & Matthews,
2005; Manchin, 2006). Third, the extent of NTBs faced by developing
countries specifically restricts the utilisation of preferential arrange-
ments (Mohan, Khorana, & Choudhury, 2013).
The idea that the above-mentioned features may moderate the
likelihood to utilise the GSP scheme is not entirely new; however, to
the best of our knowledge, the United Kingdom's GSP has not been
examined in a unified context of these features. We fill this gap.
The results in this article could lead us to an intuitive conclusion
that GSP beneficiaries failed to utilise the preferences to the full
extent in trade with the United Kingdom. While the utilisation rates of
GSP are typically high and positively related to the size of preference
margin, it was found that both utilisation and coverage rates signifi-
cantly declined at the post-reform period. As such, the modified
scheme has not provided further market access for all the beneficia-
ries and products in the United Kingdom. This can be attributed to
several factors. For instance, successive turns of multilateral trade
liberalisation which eroded preference margins and made it difficult
for many of the beneficiaries to keep up with expected utilisation
rates. Also, the growing figure of economic partnership agreements
and FTAs finalised by the EU in recent years further undermined the
relevancy of the GSP scheme.
In what follows, the present United Kingdom GSP has only
favoured a relatively small cluster of developing countries that appear
to be well integrated into the multilateral trading system. This is
evidenced by the result in Table 3 where the average GSP utilisation
rate by major trading partners was 88.83% and exceeding the 85.88%
average utilisation rate by all the beneficiaries. Further evidence
comes from the fact that Cambodia and Bangladesh benefit the most
while many EBA sub-Saharan African countries gain so little. Taking
these into account, coupled with the disappointingly low coverage
and utility rates across products and countries, it would be a signifi-
cant missed opportunity for the United Kingdom to simply copy exis-
ting arrangements rather than seek to improve upon the EU's
approach to GSP. In the short run, it is recommended that the existing
GSP approach be strengthened by incorporating improved preference
margins and products coverage, together with more liberal rules of
origin criteria for preferential imports. In the long run, it is advised
that; (a) GSP eligibility criteria be reviewed to adequately capture eco-
nomic vulnerability metrics as this will make United Kingdom GSP
more geared towards developing countries most in need, (b) the exis-
ting supply chain constraints in the beneficiary countries should be
addressed to enhance their competitiveness and catalyse their inte-
gration into the global economy. The short and long run recommenda-
tions are fully described below.
5.1 | Improve preference margins for product
imported under the United Kingdom GSP
This article shed new light on the utilisation of the United Kingdom
GSP by looking at three ranges of preference margins. Our analysis
demonstrates that utilisation widens with the spread of preference
margin and the value of export. It is also revealed that only about 50%
of the agricultural imports showcased significant preference margins—
largely products of HS Chapters 16–24 (Prepared Foodstuffs, Bever-
ages, etc.). And the other products with low preference margins are
found to feature low MFN tariffs. This suggests that the scope for
providing preferential access through tariff reductions is limited, and
this is a fundamental feature of the EU GSP, arising from a widespread
low level of MFN tariffs.
As tariffs reduction becomes widespread across the globe, the
margins created by the preferential tariffs become increasingly insig-
nificant. While the existing GSP scheme will probably not be
suspended as a result of reduced utilisation of the scheme, it will pos-
sibly lose its relative relevance sooner or later if insufficient margins
persist. This, therefore, calls for a strengthened framework of the
United Kingdom preferential tariffs post-Brexit such that MFN rates
are lowered in relation to preferential tariffs to maintain a reasonably
high preferential margin.
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5.2 | Allow broader product coverage for product
imports under the United Kingdom GSP
As illustrated earlier, the preferential market access offered via the
United Kingdom GSP showcases an extensive coverage gap across
the applicable regime. Even though, the United Kingdom GSP covers
roughly 66% of product lines, a 6-digit level analysis revealed that
only about 28% of the dutiable imports (with MFN > 0) from develop-
ing countries are offered duty-free access. The exclusion of certain
products and countries under the GSP program further heightened
the existing coverage gaps. For instance, the two main exports of
Belize (banana and sugar), two exports of Ghana (bananas and yams),
three exports of Jamaica (sugar, sweet oranges and rum) and four of
Swaziland's main exports are not covered under the current United
Kingdom GSP regime.
Resulting from the insufficient coverage of developing countries'
main exports are strong efforts by them to increase their processing
capacity. However, they are faced with tariff escalation in higher-
value products and this has inhibited their capacity to process
agricultural products beyond their natural form. This undermines the
developmental impact of a preferential arrangement and the affected
developing countries might be tempted to believe that GSP scheme is
a hoax. Given this, the alternative preferential arrangement becomes
appealing to them and the utilisation rates of GSP dwindle. The case
of EBA is much better as beneficiaries are offered duty-free access to
everything except arms. As such, there is an extensive product cover-
age to around 99% of product lines. However, EBA eligibility is
restricted to least developed countries (LDCs).
A redesigned post-Brexit GSP scheme by the United Kingdom
could scale up the EU's approach by unifying the three variants of the
United Kingdom GSP to align with the developmental expectations of
eligible countries. To achieve this, it is recommended that the United
Kingdom extend the comprehensive product coverage of the EBA
program to non-LDCs. This would allow the main exports of develop-
ing countries to benefit from improved market access and offer an
enhanced capacity to diversify via removal of tariff peaks and
escalation.
5.3 | Streamline the existing rules of origin
It is important to point out that, rules of origin provide a good plat-
form to subject product imports to checks to ascertain compliance
with regulatory standards and to consider for appropriate tariffs.
However, excessively stringent rules of origin could be harmful to
regional cooperation and restrain the scope to enhance developing
countries' share of value addition. A handful number of developing
countries depend on components and products that are not produced
locally. When such parts are imported and added to the list of raw
materials in production, products of developing countries might be
disqualified as “wholly obtained” under rules of origin criteria. This,
essentially, limit the ability to develop countries to process and export
higher-value products, and in effect, restrict their exports of primary
products. This description reflects the complex approach of the cur-
rent EU scheme in which the regulation on GSP rules of origin
includes different thresholds depending on the relevant HS chapter.
By streamlining the United Kingdom rules of origin criteria to
allow for a robust Cumulation, materials from other countries can be
combined, processed, and exported by developing countries without
necessarily facing tariff escalation or penalty. The post-Brexit GSP
scheme could encompass the proposals of developing countries in the
Nairobi WTO ministerial declaration by adopting flexible and simple
rules of origin that allow the Cumulation of products from any eligible
country. The United Kingdom could even pursue a more robust option
of allowing the LDCs to effectively abolish rules of origin by creating a
“global Cumulation” classification. This would mainly relax the origin
criterion to a maximum of 100% foreign content, lower the existing
barriers to trade and increase the utilisation rate of the GSP scheme.
5.4 | Enhance the eligibility criteria for preferential
market access under the United Kingdom GSP
The WTO rules specifically condition GSP eligibility on objective
developmental criteria. However, there is no universally agreed-upon
criterion for what makes a country developing, making it contentious
to identify certain developing countries as most in need of GSP treat-
ment. The World Bank classification of countries based on income
groups has attracted huge criticisms on account that it does not ade-
quately capture certain developmental metrics. This article does not
aim to recommend a one-size-fits-all approach but rather suggests a
flexible framework that can address a variety of needs. The United
Kingdom can essentially design inclusive criteria that cover non-
economic indicators, whether it be social, socioeconomic, or environ-
mental, to determine the eligibility of developing countries for GSP
treatment.
It is recommended that such methodology captures a large set of
indicators such as educational attainment, the tendency of natural
disaster, level of gender equality and carbon embodiment. This way,
the United Kingdom would come up with a future-oriented GSP
scheme that addresses the needs of structurally weak, vulnerable, and
small economies (SWVSEs). The adoption of such criteria would also
enable a wider range of “countries most in need” to be granted GSP
treatment than may have been excluded based on income classifica-
tion alone. This offers an opportunity for the United Kingdom to pio-
neer a forward-thinking assessment for identifying countries most in
need under the GSP scheme.
5.5 | Address supply chain constraints, regulatory
institutions and economic governance in developing
countries
The effectiveness of the GSP scheme can be strengthened by aid for
trade, regulatory cooperation, trade facilitation and investment pro-
motion. Specifically, aids for trade can make a real difference in
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improving supply capacity and that could be linked to the utilisation
of the GSP scheme. On theoretical grounds, schemes of trade prefer-
ences should not be isolated from the above-mentioned factors if
deeper trade and development partnership is considered necessary to
address supply-side constraints. Such efforts would make SMEs thrive
and could result in enhanced effectiveness of the GSP scheme.
Of huge importance are other supports that extend beyond the
capacity of supply-side projects and targeted at improving regulatory
institutions and economic governance in developing countries. Not-
withstanding the EU is the largest provider of aid for trade, literature
evidenced a lack of success in using such instrument to build develop-
ing countries' trade capacity and the infrastructure they need to bene-
fit from GSP scheme. Also, despite the EU Policy Coherence for
Development, it has been noticed that both DG TRADE and DG
DEVCO, which deal with trade and development agenda, are less inte-
grated at the EU level than they are with some individual member
states. As a result, the EU schemes of trade preferences and other
trade agenda with developing countries have been criticised as having
fewer impacts on developmental parameters.
After Brexit, the United Kingdom could play an important role in
showing how the above-mentioned policies can be integrated into
trade policy initiatives and in essence make GSP scheme an effective
instrument of economic development. This would provide demonstra-
tion effects regarding the benefits of United Kingdom GSP and high-
light the opportunities it creates.
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APPENDIX A.
TABLE A1 Studies on utilisation of trade preferences
S/N Authors
Period
covered Country Variables Data sources Methodology Findings
1 Candau and
Jean (2004)
2001 EU Coverage rate;
utilisation rate;
utility rate
Eurostat Descriptive efficiency
estimation
Weak utilisation rate
caused by strict RoOs
2 Gallezot and
Bureau (2005)
2002 EU Utilisation rate
Preference
margin
TRADEPREF
database
Descriptive efficiency
estimation
Weak utilisation rates.
Preferences are more
used when more
predictable and durable
3 Wijayasiri (2007) 2000–2004 EU and US Utilisation rate
Coverage rate
Utility rate
Eurostat Descriptive efficiency
estimation
The weak utilisation rate
for the EU GSP scheme
caused by strict rules of
origin criteria
4 Aiello and
Demaria (2010)
2001–2007 EU Export flows COMTRADE
database
Gravity model High utilisation at country
level, mixed evidence at
the product level
5 Bureau et al.
(2007)
2002 EU and United
States
Utilisation rate
Preference
margin
Export volume
TRADEPREF
database
Probit model High utilisation linked to
preference margin
6 Gallezot and
Bureau (2005)
2002 EU Utilisation rate
Preference
margin
TRADEPREF
database
Descriptive efficiency
estimation
High utilisation rate across
several products and
countries
7 Hakobyan (2011) 2008 United States Utilisation rate USITC trade
database
Descriptive efficiency
estimation
Low utilisation rates
caused by weak
production structure of
beneficiary countries
8 Keck and Lendle
(2012)
2008 Australia, Canada,
EU and the
United States
Utilisation rate Eurostat and
USITC
Descriptive efficiency
estimation
High utilisation rates and
increases with the size of
the preference margin
and the export value
9 Demaria and
Drogue (2008)
2013 EU Utilisation rate Eurostat Descriptive efficiency
estimation
Overall high utilisation
rates
Abbreviations: GSP, generalised system of preferences; RoOs, rules of origins.
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